We evaluate the asymptotics of equivocations, their exponents as well as their second-order coding rates under various Rényi information measures. Specifically, we consider the effect of applying a hash function on a source and we quantify the level of non-uniformity and dependence of the compressed source from another correlated source when the number of copies of the sources is large. Unlike previous works that use Shannon information measures to quantify randomness, information, or uniformity, we define our security measures in terms of a more general class of information measures-the Rényi information measures and their Gallager-type counterparts. A special case of these Rényi information measure is the class of Shannon information measures. We prove tight asymptotic results for the security measures and their exponential rates of decay. We also prove bounds on the second-order asymptotics and show that these bounds match when the magnitudes of the second-order coding rates are large. We do so by establishing new classes non-asymptotic bounds on the equivocation and evaluating these bounds using various probabilistic limit theoremsxxx asymptotically.
source (A n , E n ). One of the central tasks in informationtheoretic security is to understand the effect of applying a hash function [1] (binning operator) f on A n . This hash function is used to ensure that the compressed source f (A n ) is almost uniform on its alphabet and also almost independent of another discrete memoryless source E n . Mathematically, we want to understand the deviation of f (A n ) ∈ {1, . . . , e n R } from the uniform distribution on the same support P mix, f (A n ) and the level of remaining dependence between f (A n ) and a correlated source E n . These two criteria can be described by equivocation measures. Traditionally in information-theoretic security [2] , [3] , equivocation is measured in terms of the Shannon-type quantities such as the Shannon entropy, relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence), and mutual information. In particular, it is common to design f such that the following is small for any rate R:
Clearly if the above quantity is small in some sense, the message f (A n ) is close to uniform and almost independent of E n , two desirable traits of a hash function for security applications.
A. Motivations
A novel feature of this paper is that we depart from using Shannon information measures to quantify randomness and independence. It is known that the Shannon entropy H or the relative entropy D are special cases of a larger family of information measures known as Rényi information measures, denoted as H 1+s and D 1+s for s ∈ R. Thus, as expounded by Iwamoto and Shikata [4] , we can quantify equivocation using these measures, gaining deeper insights into the fundamental limits of information leakage under the effect of hash functions. There may also be a possibility of the optimal key generation rate changing when we use alternative information measures. In addition, in the study of cryptography and quantum key distribution (QKD), the Rényi entropy of order 2 [5] (or collision entropy) H 2 (A|P A ) := − log a∈A P A (a) 2 and the min-entropy H min (A|P A ) := − log max a∈A P A (a) play important roles in quantifying randomness. A case in point is the leftover hash lemma [6] - [8] . Another motivation stems from the recent study of overcoming weak expectations by Dodis and Yu [9] where cryptographic primitives are based on weak secrets, in which the only information about the secret is some fraction of min-entropy. Dodis and Yu [9] provided 0018-9448 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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bounds on the weak expectation E f (Y ) of some function f of a random variable Y in terms of the min-entropy and the Rényi entropy of order 2. In a follow-on paper by Yao and Li [10] , this study was generalized to Rényi entropies of general orders. Finally, in the study of secure authentication codes (or A-codes in short), which is one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols in information-theoretic cryptography, Shikata [11] quantified lengths of secret keys in terms of Rényi entropies of general orders. Motivated by these studies, the authors opine that it is of interest to study the performance of hashing under these generalized families of entropies (generalized uncertainty measures) and divergences (generalized distance measures).
B. Main Contributions
We consider three asymptotic settings-the asymptotics of Rényi-type security measures, its exponential decay and a certain second-order behavior.
1) First, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the security measure
for a fixed rate R = 1 n log f where f := | f (A n )| is the cardinality of the range of a hash function f . The function f will be taken to be a random hash function as we will explain and motivate later. Further, as we shall see in Section II-B, the quantity in (2) is closely related to the equivocation [12] . In Section III (particularly in Corollary 1 therein), we show that if we measure security using D 1+s with s > 0, the fundamental limits of key generation rates change relative to those for traditional Shannon-type measures D 1 . The security measure in (2) quantifies the deviation of the hashed or compressed random variable f (A n ) from the uniform distribution and also its remaining dependence from a correlated random variable E n . 2) We are also interested in the speed of the exponential decay of (2) given a fixed rate R. That is, we are interested in the asymptotic behavior of
This is likened to error exponent or reliability function analysis in classical information theory [13] , [14] . We study this in Section IV. 3) Finally, in Section V, we also study the second-order asymptotics [15] , [16] of the decay of D 1+s with the blocklength, i.e., the asymptotic behavior of
and 1 √ n log D 1+s (P f ( A n ),E n P mix, f (A n ) × P E n ).
where the number of compressed symbols (size of the hash function) f equals e n R+ √ nL for some firstorder rate R (usually the conditional Rényi entropy) and second-order rate L ∈ R. For some cases Fig. 1 . Illustration of applying a hash function f Xn on the source A n . Common randomness X n , independent of a correlated source E n , is available to all parties and it determines the hash function f Xn . We would like f Xn ( A n ) to be uniform on its support {1, . . . , f Xn } and almost independent of E n in the sense of ensuring that quantity in (2) is small. We examine (2) under different asymptotic regimes such as the equivocation, the exponential behavior (3) , and the second-order asymptotics (4)- (5) .
(Rényi parameter less than one) where we cannot exactly determine the tight second-order asymptotics (i.e., the upper and lower bounds do not match), we study the asymptotic behavior of (2) when the second-order rate L tends to +∞ or −∞. In this case, the upper and lower bounds match up to and including a term quadratic in L. We also mention a relevant work by Hayashi et al. [17] who derived general expressions and second-order results for the secret key agreement problem. As we mentioned earlier, we will regard f as a random hash function in the sequel. That is, it is randomly selected depending on a random variable X n ∈ X n that is available to all parties and is also independent of all other random variables. This random variable has distribution P X n . See Fig. 1 . To further elaborate, instead of the the Rényi divergences in (2)- (5) , for the purposes of asserting the existence of a particular function f with some desired properties (cf. the random selection argument), we consider the quantity D (n) 1+s := D 1+s (P f Xn ( A n ),E n ,X n P mix, f Xn (A n ) × P E n × P X n ).
Here, we note that f X n is a random hash function (to be defined precisely in Definition 1) and f X n (A n ) is a constant random variable, i.e., it does not depend on the realization of X n . Even though D (n) 1+s in (6) is not an expectation of any quantity of interest, exp (1 + s)D (n) 1+s is the expectation of
where the probability of observing x n is P X n (x n ). Thus by a random selection argument, if the former is less than ε > 0, there exist an x * n ∈ X n , indexing a deterministic protocol f x * n , such thatD (n) 1+s (x * n ) is also less than ε. When s = 0, the expectation of quantities in (2)- (5) under the common randomness X n generating a universal 2 hash function f X n (·) is equivalent to the quantity in (6) but for s = 0, they are, in general, different. In the sequel, we adopt the latter criterion in (6) to simplify the presentation of the results.
We believe the results contained herein may serve as logical starting points to derive tight exponential error bounds and second-order coding rates for the wiretap channel [12] (as was done in [18] and [19] ) and other information-theoretic security problems such as the secret key agreement [20] (as was done in [21] and [22] ) problem. The leakage rates for these problems may be measured using traditional Shannon information measures or Rényi information measures (or their Gallager-type counterparts). Here, we are only concerned with the secrecy requirement rather than both the secrecy and reliability requirements of the wiretap problem. The reliability requirement can be handled using, by now, standard error exponent analyses [13] , [14] .
C. Related Works
In [23] and [18] , Hayashi generalized and strengthened the seminal privacy amplification analyses of Bennett et al. [7] , Renner [24] and Renner and Wolf [25] to obtain exponential error bounds for the leakage rate of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel and the secrey key agreement problems [2] , [3] , [12] , [20] . The leakage rate was measured by the mutual information I (A ∧ E|P AE ) and the variational (or trace) distance P AE − P A × P E 1 . The exact exponents for the variational distance are, by now, well known [19] , [26] .
However, the results concerning the exponential decay of the leakage rate quantified via the mutual information contained in [18] , and further generalized to other setings in [21] and [22] , are only achievability results (i.e., lower bounds on the exponents). The converse has been open for some time. The present contribution, though not focusing on the wiretap channel or any specific information-theoretic security problem, derives tight exponential bounds for a generalization of the Shannon information measures, namely the family of Rényi information measures. In the process, we obtain a tight result for the exponential leakage rate for the mutual information, thus resolving the converse part that was open in [18] , [21] , and [22] . As a by-product, for some range of the Rényi parameter, we also obtain tight exponents for security measures defined using the Rényi divergence under various hash functions.
Hayashi and Tsurumaru [27] proposed an efficient construction of hash functions for the purpose of privacy amplification with less random seeds, thus potentially realizing the system in Fig. 1 with less random resources. Other works along the lines of deriving exponential error bounds for information-theoretic security problems include those by Hou and Kramer [28] , [29] , Pierrot and Bloch [30] , Bloch and Laneman [31] , Han et al. [32] and Parizi and Telatar [33] . After the present work was submitted, Parizi et al. [34] proved ensemble tight exponential error bounds for the wiretap channel by appealing to type counting methods and channel resolvability arguments.
D. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we state the relevant preliminaries and define relevant information measures and security criteria for understanding the rest of the paper. In Section III, we state our results for the asymptotics of the equivocation. In Section IV, we state our results for the exponential behavior of the Rényi-type security criteria. In Section V, we state our results for the secondorder asymptotics of the equivocation. We also consider the case where the magnitudes of the second-order rates are large. These are proved using novel one-shot bounds which are stated in Section VI. The proofs of the asymptotic results are provided in Section VII. We conclude the paper in Section VIII by summarizing our key contributions and stating avenues for further investigations. The proofs of the oneshot bounds are rather technical and are thus relegated to the Appendices.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND INFORMATION MEASURES

A. Basic Shannon and Rényi Information Quantities
We now introduce some information measures that generalize Shannon's information measures. Fix a normalized distribution P A ∈ P(A) and a non-negative measure (a non-negative vector but not necessarily summing to one) Q A ∈P(A) supported on a finite set A. Then the relative entropy and the Rényi divergence of order 1+s are respectively defined as
where throughout, log is to the natural base e and s ≥ −1. It is known that lim s→0 D 1+s (P A Q A ) = D(P A Q A ) so a special case of the Rényi divergence is the usual relative entropy. It is known that the map s → s D 1+s (P A Q A ) is concave in s ∈ R and hence D 1+s (P A Q A ) is monotonically increasing for s ∈ R. Furthermore, the following data processing or information processing inequalities for Rényi divergences hold for s ∈ [−1, 1],
Here W : A → B is any stochastic matrix (channel) and P A W (b) := a W (b|a)P A (a) is the output distribution induced by W and P A . We use P mix,A to denote the uniform distribution on A. We also introduce conditional entropies on the joint alphabet A × E. If P AE is a distribution on A × E, the conditional entropy and the conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + s relative to another normalized distribution Q E on E as
Here I A (a) = 1 for each a ∈ A and it is known that lim s→0 H 1+s (A|E|P AE Q E ) = H (A|E|P AE Q E ).
If Q E = P E , we simplify the notation and denote the conditional entropy and the conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + s as
The function s → s H 1+s (A|E|P AE ) is concave, and H 1+s (A|E|P AE Q E ) is monotonically decreasing on (0, ∞) and (−∞, 0). We are also interested in the so-called Gallager form of the conditional Rényi entropy for a joint distribution P AE ∈ P(A × E):
s log (17) we can express (16) as
thus (loosely) justifying the nomenclature "Gallager form" of the conditional Rényi entropy in (16 
Thus, we regard H ↑ 1 (A|E|P AE ) as H (A|E|P AE ), i.e., for Rényi parameter α = 1 + s = 1, the conditional Rényi entropy and its Gallager form coincide. We also find it useful to consider a two-parameter family of the conditional Rényi entropy:
Clearly,
so two-parameter conditional Rényi entropy is a generalization of the Gallager form of the conditional Rényi entropy in (16) . For a fixed joint source P AE definê
We note thatR s andR ↑ s are monotonically non-increasing in s because the functions t → t H 1+t (A|E|P AE ) and
is convex is because the maximum of convex functions is convex; cf. (19) . Furthermore, bothR s and R ↑ s are non-negative by direct evaluation of the derivatives and noting that log P A|E (a|e) ≤ 0. We assume, henceforth, that the source P AE satisfies the conditions that t → t H 1+t (A|E|P AE ) and t → t H ↑ 1+t (A|E|P AE ) are both strictly concave sô R s andR ↑ s are both monotonically decreasing in s. The Rényi entropies can be shown to satisfy a form of data processing inequality. In particular if f : A → M is any function on the set A, we have
Inequalities (27) and (28) hold true for all s > −1. These inequalities say that processing the random variable A cannot increase its randomness measured under any of the above conditional Rényi entropies.
B. Rényi Security Criteria
Now, we introduce various criteria that measure independence and uniformity jointly. The mutual information is
This, together with its normalized version, has been traditionally used as measure of dependence in classical informationtheoretic security [2] , [3] , going back to the seminal work of Wyner [12] for the wiretap channel. It was also used by Ahlswede and Csiszár for the secret key agreement problem [20] . However, it does not guarantee approximate uniformity of the source P A on A. Thus, we introduce the modified mutual information
This quantity was also introduced by Csiszár and Narayan [36, eq. (6) ] in their work on secrecy capacities. An axiomatic justification of C(A|E|P AE ) was provided recently by Hayashi [37, Th. 8 ]. The modified mutual information C(A|E|P AE ) clearly satisfies
Hence, if C(A|E|P AE ) is small, A is approximately independent of E and A is approximately uniform on its alphabet, desirable properties in information-theoretic security. We may further generalize the modified mutual information by considering Rényi information measures, introduced in Section II-A, as follows: (34) This can be relaxed to give yet another security measure-the Gallager-form of the modified mutual information:
We characterize these quantities asymptotically when
The quantities H 1+s and H ↑ 1+s can be regarded as equivocations [12] so C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s are the negative of the equivocations up to a shift. We work with C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s in the rest of the paper as they are more convenient and they admit the interpretation as security criteria.
C. Decomposition of the Rényi Security Criteria Into Mutual Information and Divergence Terms
We note that for any s ≥ −1, C 1+s (A|E|P AE ) = 0 if and only if P AE = P mix,A × P E or equivalently, A is uniform on A and statistically independent of E. This is because D 1+s (P Q) is a divergence so D 1+s (P Q) = 0 if and only if P = Q [38] . The same is true for the case C ↑ 1+s (A|E|P AE ) = 0. From this observation, we see that C 1+s (A|E|P AE ) and C ↑ 1+s (A|E|P AE ) also measure how close the source or "key" A is to uniform and how secure A is from an adversary E. Thus the quantities we consider are generalizations of the standard security measure C(A|E|P AE ) in (32) and measure uniformity and security in a different way.
More quantitatively, one may wonder whether the security criteria C 1+s (A|E|P AE ) and C ↑ 1+s (A|E|P AE ) admit a decomposition into "mutual information" and "divergence" terms and similar to (32) . We first consider C 1+s (A|E|P AE ). Define g s (a) := e P AE (a, e) 1+s P E (e) −s . We then see from the definition of the Rényi divergence of order (1 + s) that 
Invoking the definition of g s (a), we see that the first term can be rewritten as 1+s s log a g s (a ) 
Because Q (0) A = P A , and lim s→0 I (Sibson) 1+s (43) is a generalization of (32) . Equation (43) is also reminiscent of an information geometric Pythagorean theorem [43] (but for Rényi divergence here). The distribution Q Next we consider the Gallager-form of the modified mutual information C ↑ 1+s (A|E|P AE ). From (36) , it can be seen by adding and subtracting H 1+s (A|P A ) that (44) We recognize that the sum of the first two terms constitutes Arimoto's [45] definition of the order-(1 + s) Rényi mutual information
Since lim s→0 I (Arimoto) 1+s (A ∧ E|P AE ) = I (A ∧ E|P AE ), the security criterion C ↑ 1+s (A|E|P AE ) also admits a decomposition similar to (32) . See [40, Sec. II.A] for detailed discussions of the properties of I (Arimoto) 1+s (A ∧ E|P AE ).
III. ASYMPTOTICS OF THE EQUIVOCATION
In this section we present our results concerning the asymptotic behavior of the equivocation. First we define precisely the notion of hash function. This is a generalization of the definition by Carter and Wegman [1] .
Definition 1: A random 1 hash function f X is a stochastic map from A to M := {1, . . . , M}, where X denotes a random variable describing its stochastic behavior. An ensemble of random hash functions f X is called an -almost universal 2 hash function if it satisfies the following condition: For any distinct a 1 , a 2 ∈ A,
When = 1, we simply say that the ensemble of functions is a universal 2 hash function.
As an example, if we randomly and uniformly assign each element of a ∈ A into one of M bins indexed by m ∈ M (i.e., the familiar random binning process introduced by Cover [46] ), then Pr( f X (a 1 ) = f X (a 1 )) = 1 M so this is a universal 2 hash function, and furthermore, (46) is achieved with equality.
Let |t| + = max{0, t}. The following is our first main result. Theorem 1 (Asymptotics of the Equivocation): Let 2 M n = e n R . Assume that f X n : A n → M n = {1, . . . , M n } is a random hash function. 3 For any s ∈ [0, 1], we have
Furthermore, for any s ∈ (0, 1], we also have
where recall thatR −s andR ↑ −s are defined in (24) and (25) respectively. (Also see (51) and (52) for alternative representations.) Furthermore, the infima in (47)-(50) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n (where is a fixed positive number).
This result is proved in Section VII-A. The ideas to prove the direct parts (upper bounds on the leakage rates) for the s = 0 cases are contained in previous works such as [18] , [21] , and [22] . All other parts are novel.
We remark that the converse parts (lower bounds) to (47)-(48) hold for all s ≥ 0 (and not only being upper bounded by 1) owing to the data processing inequalities in (27)- (28) . Furthermore, instead of the formulae in (24) and (25) , the rates in which the behavior of the security measures changeR −s andR ↑ −s can also be expressed aŝ
These alternative expressions forR −s andR ↑ −s will be useful in the proof of Theorem 1.
The results in (47)- (50) imply that an optimum sequence of hash functions { f X n } n∈N is such that asymptotically the normalized security measure C 1+s and its Gallager-type counterpart C ↑ 1+s increase linearly with the rate R if the rate is larger than the conditional Rényi entropy and its Gallagertype counterpart. However, note that this only holds for the case where R is greater than the analogue of the critical rates, defined in (24)- (25) in the case where the Rényi parameter α = 1 − s is less than one. Observe that there is difference in behavior when we consider the other direction, i.e., the quantities C 1−s and C Finally, we examine the optimal (maximum) key generation rates, i.e., the largest rates R for which there exists a sequence of functions from A n to {1, . . . , e n R } such that 1 n C 1+s or 1 n C ↑ 1+s tend to zero as the blocklength grows. We observe from the following corollary that this cutoff rate depends strongly on the sign of s. In particular for s ∈ (0, 1], the cutoff rates are H 1+s (A|E|P AE ) and H ↑ 1+s (A|E|P AE ) respectively, while for s ∈ [−1, 0], the cutoff rates are both equal to (47) and (49) for the discrete memoryless multiple source P AE where P AE (0, 0) = 0.7 and P AE (0, 1) = P AE (1, 0) = P AE (1, 1) = 0.1. the Shannon conditional entropy H (A|E|P AE ) independent of s. This difference between the behaviors of the optimal key generation rates depending on the sign of s (also illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4) is somewhat surprising (at least to the authors).
Corollary 1 (Optimal Key Generation Rates): We have
where the minimizations are over all f : A n → {1, . . . , e n R }. Proof: We only prove the statement for C 1+s in (53) since that for C ↑ 1+s in (54) is completely analogous. The case for s ∈ (0, 1] is obvious from (47) in Theorem 1 since the limit is |R − H 1+s (A|E|P AE )| + . Now, for the case
Thus, referring to (49) in Theorem 1, the optimal t in the optimization max t ∈[0,s] t s (R − H 1−t (A|E|P AE )) is attained at t = 0 and consequently, the optimal objective value is 0. On the other hand, for any R > H (A|E|P AE ), the optimal t ∈ (0, s] and so the optimal objective value is (strictly) positive. Thus, for s ∈ [−1, 0], the optimal key generation rate is the Shannon conditional entropy H (A|E|P AE ). This concludes the proof for (53) .
In Section I-A, we alluded to the importance of the collision entropy H 2 in cryptography and QKD. The implication of (53) in Corollary 1 is that if we operate at a hashing rate R > H 2 and we employ the security criterion C 2 , then there will inevitably be some residual leakage of the source A n given a hashed version f (A n ) and side-information E n .
Because of the normalizations of C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s by n in (53) and (54), Corollary 1 is analogous to results in the vast majority of the literature in information-theoretic security [2] , [3] where the weak secrecy criterion is employed. We address the analogue of the strong secrecy criterion [47] in Theorem 2 to follow where we not only demand that the unnormalized quantities C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s vanish with n, we also demand that they do so exponentially fast and we identify the exponents.
IV. EXPONENTIAL BEHAVIOR OF THE SECURITY MEASURES
In this section, we evaluate the exponential rates of decay of the security measures C 1±s and C ↑ 1±s for fixed rates R above an analogue of the critical rate.
Theorem 2 (Exponents of the Equivocation): Let M n = e n R . Assume that f X n : A n → M n = {1, . . . , M n } is a random hash function. For R ≥R 1 (R s being defined in (24)), and any s ∈ [0, 1], we have
For the Gallager-type counterparts of the Rényi quantities and R ≥R ↑ 1 (R ↑ s being defined in (25) ), and any s ∈ [0, 1], we also have
The infima in (55)-(58) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n . (55) and (56) respectively for the discrete memoryless multiple source P AE as in Fig. 3 . The curves for C 1/2 and C 1 are identical and they are equal to zero for all rates R ≥ H 1 = 0.4400 bits per source symbol (cf. Corollary 1).
This result is proved in Section VII-B. The techniques for the direct parts are somewhat similar to those in [23] , [18] , and [22] using improved versions of Bennett et al.'s [7] bound which was based on the Rényi entropy of order 2. However, the non-asymptotic bounds (e.g., Lemma 5) and asymptotic evaluations for the converse parts require new ideas. Different from the direct part, we need to convert the evaluation of e −sC 1−s and e − s 1−s C ↑ 1−s into information spectrum [48] quantities (involving the conditional entropy random variable) so that is is amenable to asymptotic evaluation. These information spectrum quantities are then evaluated using various large deviation [49] bounds, such as Cramer's theorem. We make several other observations.
First, the exponents of the security indices (namely (34) and (36)). The expressions in (56) and (58) are already nonnegative and so we only need to include the | · | + operation for (55) and (57) .
Second, the derivative of the conditional Rényi entropieŝ R 1 andR ↑ 1 are the analogues of the critical rate in error exponent analysis [13] , [14] . For the exponents, we have a complete characterization of the exponential rates of decay of both C 1±s and C ↑ 1±s for s ∈ [0, 1] and they are given by optimization of quantities that are related to the conditional Rényi entropy. We observe that the Gallager form results in larger exponents in general as the optimizations in (56) and (58) are larger than their non-Gallager counterparts in (55) and (57) respectively.
Finally, the exponents in (55) and (56) of Theorem 2 are illustrated in Fig. 5 . We observe the same behavior for the exponents of the Gallager forms in (57) and (58) since the expressions are the same and so we omit these cases. We note (from the plot and from direct evaluations) that the zero-crossings for the exponents of C 1/2 , C 1 , C 3/2 and C 7/4 occur at H 1 , H 1 , H 3/2 and H 7/4 respectively (H 1 being the Shannon entropy). This is in line with Corollary 1. Indeed, the exponent being positive implies that the normalized security measures 1 n C 1±s and 1 n C ↑ 1±s vanish as blocklength grows.
Thus, we conclude that the optimal key generation rates under both the strong and weak secrecy criteria are the same.
V. SECOND-ORDER ASYMPTOTICS
In the previous sections, the security measures in terms of equivocations and their logarithms were normalized by the blocklength n. In this section, we study different normalizations, e.g., by √ n. In addition, we examine the effect of changing the size of the hash function M n from e n R (considered in Sections III and IV) to e n R+ √ nL , where L ∈ R is an arbitrary real number.
A. Basic Definitions
To present our results, we first define the following important quantities.
Definition 2: Given a discrete joint source P AE ∈ P (A × E), define the conditional varentropy [50] or conditional source dispersion [51] , [52] to be
We also define the following variants of the conditional varentropy
One can readily check that V = V 1 +V 2 from the definitions. This also follows immediately from the law of total variance. Let
be the cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian random variable. With these definitions, we are ready to state our results on the second-order asymptotics for the security measures C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s which are simple functions of the equivocation H 1+s and H ↑ 1+s respectively. Note that the second-order analysis of C 1 (corresponding to the s = 0 case) with no side information (i.e., E = ∅) was performed in Hayashi's work [16, Th. 8] in the context of intrinsic randomness based on the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence) criterion. The other results in Theorems 3 and 4 are novel.
To state our result succinctly, we define the quantities which all depend on s, L and P AE (but we suppress the dependence on the fixed joint distribution P AE for brevity):
B. Bounds on the Second-Order Asymptotics
Theorem 3 (Second-Order Asymptotics): Assume that f X n :
Consider the following three cases:
Similarly to Theorem 1, the infima in (68) and (69) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n . When L ≤ 0, we have
Similarly to Theorem 2, the infima in (70) and (71) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n .
By (21), the same asymptotic behavior also holds true for the Gallager version of the security measure C ↑ 1 ( f X n (A n )|E n X n |P n AE × P X n ). Similarly to Theorem 1, the infima in (72) is achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n .
In addition, for the Gallager-type counterparts, with M n = e n H( A|E|P AE )+ √ nL for some L ∈ R, we also have
The upper bounds in (73) and (74) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 has functions f X n . This result is proved in Section VII-C. We remark that the converse parts (lower bounds) to (68)-(69) hold for all s ≥ 0 (and not only being upper bounded by 1) owing to the data processing inequalities in (27)-(28).
C. Remarks on Theorem 3
Observe that in Theorem 3 (Case (A) for instance), the number of compressed symbols M n satisfies
or,
The leading conditional Rényi entropy terms scaling in n are known as the first-order terms, while the terms scaling as √ n are known as the second-order terms. The coefficient L is known as the second-order coding rate [16] , [53] , [54] and the second-order asymptotic characterizations depend on L. Note that even though L is termed as the second-order coding rate, it may be negative. Observe that the conditional varentropies appear in (72)-(74), which suggests that we evaluate the one-shot bounds using the central limit theorem among other techniques. We have tight results (equalities) for Cases (A) and (B) but unfortunately not for Case (C) where the Rényi parameter α = 1 − s for s ∈ (0, 1]. However, in the limit of the second-order coding rate L being large (either in the positive or negative direction), we can assert that one of the terms in the maxima in the lower bounds of (73) and (74) dominates and matches the upper bound and hence, we have a tight result up to the term in L 2 (Theorem 4). We now comment specifically on each of the cases. 1) For Case (A), the second-order asymptotic behaviors of C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s when they are normalized by 1 √ n are linear in L. Fig. 6 . Illustration of the second-order asymptotics in Case (B) given by the right-hand-side of (72) for the discrete memoryless multiple source P AE as in Fig. 3 . It is easy to see that the integral there is non-negative.
2) The same is true for Case (B) for large positive L because with V := V (A|E|P AE ),
In contrast, when L → −∞ in Case (B), the limit is zero. The second-order asymptotics in Case (B) in (72) is shown in Fig. 6 and is obtained via numerical integration to approximate the integral. The limit in (72) is monotonically increasing in L. This is intuitive because as L increases, there is potentially more leakage to E n and less uniformity on the (larger) support {1, . . . , e n H( A|E|P AE )+ √ n L }. 3) For Case (C) there is no normalization by 1 √ n and we only have bounds. However, for large |L|, we will see from Theorem 4 that the second-order asymptotic behavior is quadratic in L. The bounds on the secondorder asymptotics in the two parts (conditional Rényi entropy and its Gallager version) of Case (C) in (73) and (74) are shown in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively. We conclude that in the second-order asymptotic regime where the number of compressed symbols satisfies (75)-(76), there are distinct differences between the three regimes of the Rényi parameter α ∈ [0, 1), α = 1 and α ∈ (1, 2].
D. Approximations for Large Second-Order Coding Rates
Since for Case (C) we only have bounds, we now examine the behavior of the bounds in the limit of large |L| for which we can show tight results up to the quadratic terms.
Theorem 4 (Large Second-Order Rates): Assume that f X n :
, we have the following asymptotic results as L → ∞:
lim
Furthermore, we have the following asymptotic results as L → −∞:
The infima in (78)-(81) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n .
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Section V-E. The results in Theorem 4 are somewhat analogous and similar those in the study of the moderate-deviations asymptotics in information theory [55] - [59] . Note the difference between the results in (78)-(79) (L → ∞) versus (80)-(81) (L → −∞). The former pair of results resembles the equivocation results presented in Section III since the effective rate is (L/ √ n)-higher than the conditional Rényi entropy and there is no logarithm preceding C 1−s and C ↑ 1−s . The latter pair of results resembles the exponent results of Section IV since the effective rate is (|L|/ √ n)-lower than the conditional Rényi entropy and there is a logarithm preceding C 1−s and C 
E. Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 4. Since there are four statements in (78)-(81), we partition the proof into four distinct subsections. a) Proof of (78): (1) , and attains the maximum in the lower bound in (73) because 2 (s, L) has the additional factor 1 − s, which is smaller than 1. Also see the right plot of Fig. 7 . Thus, in this limiting regime, the lower bound matches the upper bound in (73), Fig. 7 . Illustration of the bounds on the second-order asymptotics of C 1/2 ( f Xn ( A n )|E n X n |P n AE × P Xn ) (i.e., s = 1/2) in Case (C) given by the left-and right-hand-sides of (73) for the same source. Note that the figure on the left is plotted in log scale (corresponding to (80)) while the figure on the right is plotted in linear scale. For L ≤ 0, lower bound 1 in (73) is negative (lower bound 2 dominates) so is not shown in the left plot. Observe the quadratic behaviors; this is corroborated by Theorem 4. The quadratic approximations in (78) and (80) (without the O(log L) terms) are also plotted. Observe that there is a constant offset between the quadratic and the bounds as we do not determine the O(log L) terms in Theorem 4 exactly. Fig. 8 . Illustration of the bounds on the second-order asymptotics of C ↑ 1/2 ( f Xn ( A n )|E n X n |P n AE × P Xn ) (i.e., s = 1/2) in Case (C) given by the left-and right-hand-sides of (74) for the same source. For L ≤ 0, lower bound 1 in (74) is negative (lower bound 2 dominates) so is not shown in the left plot. Observe the quadratic behaviors-this is corroborated by (79) and (81) in Theorem 4. These plots are obtained by using numerical integration to calculate the integral in 1 (s, L) in (74).
where O(1) denotes a term bounded in L (but dependent on s). Now by employing the asymptotic equality
we obtain from (82) that
which proves (78). b) Proof of (79): When L → ∞, the term 1 (s, L) dominates the maximum in the lower bound in (74) because V 2 ≤ V and thus the integrands in 1 L) . See right plot of Fig. 8 .
We can then find the x that dominates the integral in 1 (s, L). We denote this by x * . Since L is large, by (83),
Differentiating the quadratic, we obtain
The exponential term e −(x * ) 2 /(2V 1 ( A|E|P AE )) controls the behavior of the integral in 1 (s, L) and substituting (86) into this exponential term yields (79).
c) Proof of (80): Now we assume that L → −∞. In this case, we find that the term 2 (s, L) attains the maximum in the lower bound in (73) because 1 (s, L) is negative due to the constant negative term. Also see the left plot of Fig. 7 . In this case, taking the logarithm, we have
where in (87), log( 1−s s ) and log( 1 s ) can be regarded as O(1) when L → −∞, in (88), we used the fact that log(1 − t) = −t + O(t 2 ) when t ↓ 0, and finally in (89), we used (83). This proves (80).
d) Proof of (81): In the other direction, when L → −∞, we claim that the term 2 (s, L) attains the maximum. This is shown as follows: First, we find that
This is because a → a 1 1−s is convex and so the linear approximation underestimates the function. This means that
where (92) follows because the convolution of two independent zero-mean Gaussians is a Gaussian where the variances add and we also note that V = V 1 +V 2 per (61). This argument was also used in the second-order analysis of channels with state [60, Lemma 18] . Inequalities (93) and (94) follow from the fact that log(1 − x) = −x + O(x 2 ) as x ↓ 0 (note that L → −∞ so the term (L/ √ V ) tends to zero). Hence, (95) and the definitions of 2 (s, L) and 1 (s, L) (in (66) and (67) resp.) imply that 2 (s, L) asymptotically dominates 1 (s, L) as L → −∞. Also see left plot of Fig. 8 . By a similar calculation as in (87)-(89), we obtain the lower bound to (81) as follows:
where in (96), we used the above observation that 2 (1) , and finally in (99) we used the approximation in (83). To show that the upper bound in (74) matches the lower bound given by (99) (when L → −∞), we use (90) and steps similar to those in (91)-(95) to assert that
where in (101), we again used the fact that log(1 − x) = −x + O(x 2 ) for x ↓ 0. Now taking the logarithm and the limit as L → −∞, we match the lower bound in (99) completing the proof of (81).
VI. ONE-SHOT BOUNDS
To prove Theorems 1, 2 and 3, we leverage the following one-shot (i.e., blocklength n equal to 1) bounds. The proofs of these one-shot bounds are rather technical and hence we provide them in the appendices.
A. One-Shot Bounds for the Direct Parts
For the direct parts of the equivocation results, we evaluate the following one-shot bounds. The first two bounds in (102) and (103) 
In the other direction with s ∈ [0, 1],
For the direct parts of the exponents results, we evaluate the following one-shot bound. 
For the direct parts of the second-order results, we evaluate the following one-shot bound.
Lemma 3: For an ensemble of an -almost universal 2 hash functions f X : A → M = {1, . . . , M}, we have for any s ∈ [0, 1] and c > 0,
B. One-Shot Bounds for the Converse Parts
For the converse parts of the equivocation results, we evaluate the following one-shot bounds. (110) For the converse parts of the exponents results and the second-order results for the Rényi parameter being 1 + s (with s nonnegative), we evaluate the following one-shot bounds. 
For the converse parts of the second-order results for the Rényi parameter being 1 − s (with s nonnegative), we need the following one-shot bound as well as (110) 
VII. PROOFS OF THE ASYMPTOTIC RESULTS
In this section, we prove the asymptotic results in Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
Notation: Throughout, we let a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n and e = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) ∈ E n denote deterministic length-n strings. We also let A n = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) and E n = (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E n ) denote random vectors of length n. We adopt the exponential equality notation: a n . = b n if and only if lim n→∞ 1 n log a n b n = 0. Given a random variable X with distribution (probability mass function) P, we denote the expectation of a function of the random variable g(X) by E[g(X)] = x P(x)g(x). If we want to make the dependence of the expectation on X or P explicit, we write E X [g(X)] or E P [g(X)]. The same comment applies to the variance operator which we denote interchangeably as Var[g(X)], Var X [g(X)] or Var P [g(X)].
A. Proof of Theorem 1 1) Direct Parts:
We first prove the direct parts (upper bounds). a) Proof of the upper bound of (47) : The bound in (102) implies that C 1+s ( f X n (A n )|E n X n |P n AE × P X n ))
For being a constant, this achieves the upper bound of (47) upon normalizing by n and taking the lim sup. (49), we employ Cramér's theorem [49] on the sequence of random variables − log P n A|E (A n |E n ) = n i=1 − log P A|E (A i |E i ) under the product joint distribution P n AE . It is easy to see by using exponential tail bounds that
Note that the cumulant generating function of the random variable − log P A|E (A|E) under the joint distribution P AE can be expressed in terms of the conditional Rényi entropy as
explaining the presence of this term in (123). We again apply (a generalized version of) Cramer's theorem 4 to the sequence of random variables log P n A|E (A n |E n ) under the sub-distribution (non-negative product measure) P n AE (a, e)(P −s A|E ) n (a|e) and event {(a, e) : log P n A|E (a|e) ≥ −n R}. Note that the cumulant generating function in this case is τ s (t) := log a,e P AE (a, e)P −s A|E (a|e) exp t log P A|E (a|e)
and by direct differentiation, we also have that
whereR s is defined in (24) (cf.R −s is presented in a different form in (51)). Thus, by Cramér's theorem, 
where in (128), the "expectation" E is taken with respect to the non-negative measure (a, e) → P AE (a, e)P A|E (a|e). 4 The standard Cramér's theorem [ (B) where P is a probability measure and B is an event in the sample space . If P is not necessarily a probability measure but a finite non-negative measure (as it is in our applications), say μ, Cramér's theorem clearly also applies by defining the new probability measure B → P(B) := μ(B)/μ( ).
Since t ≥ 0 is arbitrary,
For the case where R ≥R −s , the constraint in the optimization above is active, i.e., t * = 0 because the function s →R −s is monotonically non-decreasing as described in Section II-A. Conversely, when R ≤R −s , the constraint is inactive, i.e., the maximum is realized with R =R −(s−t ) . Thus, we obtain
where the second clause follows by the substitution t = s − t. Now with these preparations, we can employ the one-shot bound in (104) with = 1 to prove the direct part of (49) as follows: Since (132) is not greater than (123), the former dominates in the exponent and we obtain lim sup 
where (134) follows from (104). Now we combine the asymptotic results in (123) and (132) to evaluate the asymptotic behavior of (134). In particular, we take into consideration the scaling factor 1 s . We also note that the domain of maximization of t in (123) and t in the second clause of (132) are [0, ∞) and (∞, s] respectively. So the intersection of these domains is [0, s] and the eventual max should thus be taken over [0, s]. Uniting these observations, we obtain that the upper bound lim sup
d) Proof of the upper bound of (50): The upper bound of (50) proceeds in an analogous manner. It proceeds in five distinct steps, each detailed in the following five paragraphs.
In Step 1, we manipulate the one-shot bound in (105) with = 1 as follows: 
In the following two steps, we evaluate the first and second terms in the lim inf in (137).
In Step 2, we evaluate the second term in the lim inf in (137) as it is simpler and provides the intuition and techniques for evaluating the first term. For this, we need to employ the Gärtner-Ellis theorem [49] (instead of Cramer's theorem). Doing so to the sequence of random variables − log P n A|E (A n |e) = n i=1 − log P A|E (A i |e i ) with e of fixed type [14] and A n with the memoryless distribution P n A|E (·|e), as will be shown in the following, we obtain lim n→∞ − 1 n log e P n E (e) a:P n A|E (a|e)< e −n R P n A|E (a|e)
where H 1−t |1−s (A|E|P AE ) is the two-parameter conditional Rényi entropy defined in (22) . To show (138), consider e ∈ T Q = {e ∈ E n : type(e) = Q}. Then the Gärtner-Ellis theorem [49] yields that P A n |E n =e a : P n A|E (a|e) < e −n R
Let P n (E) be the set of n-types with alphabet E. Splitting the sum on the left-hand-side in (138) into the polynomially many n-types on E, we obtain e∈E n P n E (e) a:P n A|E (a|e)< e −n R P n A|E (a|e)
where (142) follows from the fact that P n E (T Q ) [14, Ch. 2] , the swapping of min and max in (144) follows from the fact that the objective function is convex and concave in Q and t respectively, Q resides in a compact, convex set (the probability simplex) and t resides in a convex set [0, ∞) (Sion's minimax theorem [61] ). Now by straightforward calculus, the optimizing distribution for fixed t is
where the normalizing constant (partition function)
Plugging this into (144) we obtain e∈E n P n E (e) a:P n A|E (a|e)< e −n R P n A|E (a|e)
which then yields (138). Note that we have to use the Gärtner-Ellis theorem (and not Cramer's theorem) because the collection of random variables {− log P A|E (A i |e i ) : i = 1, . . . , n} is independent but not identically distributed.
In Step 3, we evaluate the first term in the lim inf in (137) again by applying the Gärtner-Ellis theorem [49] to the sequence of random variables log P n A|E (A n |e) = n i=1 log P A|E (A i |e i ) with non-negative measure P n A|E (·|e) 1−s , we have
where Q is the type of e and E Q log a P 
(149)
Consequently, considering the two different cases similarly to (132), we obtain
In Step 4, we put together the asymptotic evaluations in (138) and (151) in the bound in (137). We observe that (138) is not smaller than (151). Thus, the former dominates the exponential behavior, and plugging (138) into (137), we obtain lim sup
Finally in Step 5, we show that the transition rate in (152)
as follows.
Since max t H 1−s|1−t (A|E|P AE ) = H 1−s|1−s (A|E|P AE ) (i.e., the maximum is attained at t = s),
Hence, choosing t 1 = t 2 = t, we havê
where (156) 2) Converse Parts: For the converse, we do not consider the common randomness X n (i.e., X n = ∅) since the bound must hold for all (not just -almost universal 2 ) hash functions f X n . This statement applies to the proofs of all converse bounds in the sequel. a) Proofs of the lower bounds of (47) and (48) : The lower bounds to (47) and (48) can be easily obtained by using the data processing inequalities for Rényi conditional entropies and their Gallager-type counterparts in (26)- (28) . b) Proof of the lower bound of (49) : Now for (49), we note that when R ≥R −s , we have 
where in (162) 
Put c = 1 in (162). We then obtain the lower bound to (49) by applying (160) and its equality version for R ≤R −s . c) Proof of the lower bound of (50): Finally, (50) can be obtained by evaluating (110) as follows: be a function that only depends on s. By taking the logarithm of (168), normalizing by n, and using M n = e n R , we obtain
Now similarly to (160), we have 
B. Proof of Theorem 2 1) Direct Parts: a) Proof of the lower bound of (55):
We note, per the discussion following Theorem 2, that
and
Thus, the exponents are lower bounded by zero, explaining the | · | + in (55) and (57) . Now for the non-trivial (non-zero) lower bound on the exponents, we employ (102) with = 1 and t ∈ [s, 1]. We recall that M n = e n R . Now we have C 1+s ( f X n (A n )|E n X n |P n AE × P X n )) ≤ C 1+t ( f X n (A n )|E n X n |P n AE × P X n )) (174)
Taking the logarithm and optimizing over t ∈ [s, 1], we obtain the lower bound to (55) .
b) Proof of the lower bound of (57) : Similarly, applying (106) to the case t ∈ [s, 1], we obtain
which implies the lower bound to (57) upon optimizing over t ∈ [s, 1]. c) Proofs of the lower bounds of (56) and (58): For the −s versions in (56) and (58), we simply note that
for any s, s ∈ [0, 1] because as mentioned in Section II-A (after (15) and (20) 
Combining these statements with the bounds derived in (174)-(179) completes the proof of (56) and (58) .
2) Converse Parts: a) Proof of the upper bound of (55):
For the converse, we first show the upper bound to (55) . Choose a constant c 0 satisfying c s 0 > 1 + s. Recall the definition ofR s in (24) . Now assume that R ≥R s . We claim that This is justified as follows. We know from Cramér's theorem [49] that
The maximum appeared in right-hand-side of (185) is attained when the derivative of t H 1+t (A|E|P AE )−tR s is zero because t H 1+t (A|E|P AE ) is concave in t. Hence, the real number t satisfies
which implies t = s ≥ 0 due to the definition ofR s in (24) 
Hence, taking the logarithm of (189), employing the lower bound log(1 + b) ≥ b − b 2 2 , the large-deviations result (185), and the fact that lim n→∞
Finally, we obtain the upper bound to (55) by taking another logarithm and normalizing by n.
For the other case R ≤R s , we claim that
This is because by the strict concavity of t → t H 1+t , the map s →R s is strictly decreasing. So for R ≤R s the maximum on the right-hand-side of (191) is attained at some t ≥ s. This is also reflected in Fig 
Hence, 
where (205) follows from log(1 + a) = a + O(a 2 ) as a ↓ 0 and the fact that the summation in (203) vanishes as n grows. Combining (184) and (205) yields the upper bound to (57) for R ≥R ↑ s . A similar calculation for the case R ≤R ↑ s also yields the the same upper bound to (57) . c) Proof of the upper bound of (56) : We choose the constant c such that (1 − s) > c −s . We apply Cramer's Theorem [49] to the sequence of random variables log P n A|E (A n |E n ). Then,
The one-shot bound in (112) implies that
where (216) follows from the same reasoning as (200). Thus,
Combining (206) and (221), we have the upper bound to (58) .
C. Proof of Theorem 3 1) Direct Parts: a) Proof of upper bounds for Case (A):
First, we prove the upper bounds for Case (A) where the Rényi parameter α = 1+s for s ∈ (0, 1]. Substituting e n H 1+s ( A|E|P AE )+ √ n L into M n in the chain of inequalities in (118)-(119), we obtain, for the class of -almost universal 2 hash functions f X n , that
Set to be a constant (not varying with n). Normalizing by √ n and taking the lim sup as n → ∞ yields the upper bound to (68).
In an exactly analogous way, the upper bound to (69) can be shown by substituting e n H ↑ 1+s ( A|E|P AE )+ √ nL into M n in the chain of inequalities in (177)-(179).
Substituting e n H 1+s ( A|E|P AE )+ √ nL into M n in the chain of inequalities in (174)-(176) with t = s, we obtain
which implies the upper bound to (70) after we take the logarithm, normalize both sides by √ n and take the lim sup as n → ∞.
In an exactly analogous way, the upper bound to (71) can be shown by substituting e n H ↑ 1+s ( A|E|P AE )+ √ n L into M n in the chain of inequalities in (120)-(121). This completes the proof for the direct part of Case (A) of Theorem 3.
b) Proof of upper bound for Case (B): Case (B) follows from four distinct steps, detailed in each of the following paragraphs.
In Step 1, we fix any function f : A n → {1, . . . , f }. We partition the space A n × E n into pairs of sequences of the same joint type [14] . Let Q AE denote a generic joint type on A × E. Let U (Q AE ) be the uniform distribution over the type
be the distribution on {1, . . . , f } × E n when the hash function f is applied to the variable A n and denote
as its E n -marginal. Because the probability of pairs of sequences of the same joint type have the same P n AEprobability, we can write
By using (226), we have
where (228) follows from the fact that relative entropy is convex, (229) follows from the definition of C 1 , and (230) follows from the fact that s → C 1+s is monotonically nondecreasing.
In Step 2, we regard f as a universal 2 hash function f X n . Thus, (230) implies that
Let T Q A|E (e) := {a : (a, e) ∈ T Q AE } be the conditional type class of Q A|E given e, also known as the Q A|E -shell. By the method of types [14, Ch. 2] , we know that for e of type Q E , log T Q A|E (e) = n H (A|E|Q AE ) + O(log n).
By using the fact that e −H 2 ( A|E) is the conditional collision probability (i.e., e −H 2 ( A|E) = e P E (e)P AA |E=e {(a, a ) : a = a } where A, A are conditionally independent and identically distributed given E),
Furthermore, by a Taylor expansion of H (A|E|Q AE ) around P AE as in the rate redundancy lemma [52] , [62] , we have
(Q AE (a, e) − P AE (a, e))h A|E (a|e)
where the conditional entropy density h A|E (a|e) is defined as
and Q− P = z∈Z |Q(z)− P(z)| is the variational distance between Q and P. For brevity, we denote the √ n-scaled version of the second term in (237) as 
If Q AE is a random type formed from n independent copies of P AE ,
by the central limit theorem. That is, b n (Q AE ) converges in distribution to the Gaussian N (0, V (A|E|P AE )).
In Step 3, we first fix δ > 0. Applying the universal 2 property of the universal 2 hash function f X n to the collision relative entropy (see (118)-(119) with = s = 1), and combining the above notations and bounds, we obtain for all e ∈ T Q E and all n large enough (depending on δ) that
≤ log 1 + M n e −n H( A|E|Q AE )+O(log n) (242)
where (241) follows from the definition of C 2 and (242) uses the bound in (236). Also note that we used the fact that f = M n = e n H( A|E|P AE )+ √ nL in (243). Finally in Step 4, by plugging (244) back into (232), we obtain that for all n large enough (depending on δ),
Let V := V (A|E|P AE ). By the central limit-type convergence in (240), we obtain lim sup = P n AE (a, e) :
The probability is an information spectrum [48] term with n independent and identically distributed random variables and since P A i E i = P AE for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
So by the central limit theorem, the right-hand-side of (248) converges uniformly as follows: lim n→∞ P n AE (a, e) :
Plugging (251) into (248), taking the logarithm, and normalizing by −s yields the upper bound to (73). In a similar way, the upper bound to (74) can be obtained by specializing the one-shot bound in (108) with = 1, M n = e n H( A|E|P AE )+ √ n L and c = e −n 1/4 . The calculation for the specialization is similar to the converse part which is detailed in full in (282)-(285) in the next section. This completes the proof for the direct part of Case (C) of Theorem 3.
2) Converse Parts: a) Proof of lower bounds for Case (A): We now prove the lower bounds for Case (A). The first two bounds can be shown using the data processing inequalities in (26)- (28) . In particular, the lower bound to (68) can be evaluated as follows:
where (253) follows from (27) . The lower bound to (69) follows completely analogously using (28) .
The lower bound to (70) can be shown by first relaxing (114) as follows:
The modification here is due to the different normalization of √ n as opposed to the normalization by n in the usual Gärtner-Ellis theorem in [49] . Also see Remark (a) to [49, Th. 2.3.6] . Combining (262) with (261) yields the lower bound to (70). The lower bound to (71) can be proved in a completely analogous way by relaxing the one-shot bound in (116). b) Proof of lower bound for Case (B): For the converse part of Case (B), we use [16 Th. 8] , which analyzes the secondorder asymptotics of intrinsic randomness [48, Ch. 2] , [64] . Define the second-order coding rate at length n as
and the distribution function F (e) n which is dependent on e as
Now, from the proof of [16 Th. 8] (second column page 4634), we deduce that for each e ∈ E n ,
Now note that F (e) n (x) depends only on e through its type. Our next step is to take the expectation of (265) over e with distribution P n E . Let g(e) := P A n |E n =e a :
Since t → −t log t is concave, by Jensen's inequality, we have
Now define the averaged distribution function as
Let γ := √ n L n . From (267) and the definition of F n (x), 
Thus, by invoking the definition of L n in (263) and F n in (268), we obtain the inequality
By the central limit theorem
Taking the lim sup of (271), and using the central limit result in (272), we obtain lim sup
Since, we have the simple relation
we immediately obtain the desired lower bound for the secondorder asymptotics of C 1 : (281)
Applying the central limit theorem to the probability in the second term recovers 1 (s, L) in the lower bound in (73). The method to obtain the two terms in the maximum in the lower bound in (74) is more complicated than that for (73) because we need to condition on various sequences e ∈ E n . In particular, to obtain the lower bound 1 (s, L) in (66), we evaluate (110) with c = e n 1/4 . We obtain
As usual, the first term goes to zero. To compute the probability in the second term, let us denote the type (empirical distribution) [14] of e by Q e ∈ P n (E) for the moment. Then we have 
Now we take the logarithm, divide both sides by − s 1−s , and take the limit as n → ∞. This yields the lower bound 1 (s, L) in (66) . Note that here unlike in the steps leading to (100), we cannot add V 1 and V 2 due the exponentiation of the first term by 1 1−s in the integral.
Using similar techniques, we can obtain the lower bound 2 (s, L) defined in (67) from (113). In particular, evaluate (113) with the same choice of c. Here, in fact, no averaging over E n is needed because the first term in (113) vanishes by our choice of c = e n 1/4 . Thus, we obtain the lower bound in (74).
This completes the proof of the converse parts of Theorem 3.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
We have derived the fundamental limits of the asymptotic behavior of the equivocation when a hash function f is applied to the source (Theorem 1). We have also showed that optimal key generation rates change when we use alternative Rényi information measures (Corollary 1). Under these Rényi quantities, we have evaluated the corresponding exponential rates of decay of the security measures (Theorem 2) as well as their second-order coding rates (Theorems 3 and 4). The Rényi information measures generalize the ubiquitous Shannon information measures and may be useful in many settings as described in the Introduction. To establish our asymptotic theorems, we have introduced new families of non-asymptotic achievability and converse bounds on the Rényi information measures and their Gallager counterparts and used various probabilistic limit theorems (such as large deviation theorems and the central limit theorem) to evaluate these bounds when the number of realizations of the joint source tends to infinity.
B. Future Research Directions
In the future, we plan to explore various extensions to the results contained herein.
1) We would like to study security problems such as the remaining or residual uncertainty of a source A n when another party observes a compressed version f (A n ) ∈ M := {1, . . . , M n } and another correlated source E n . Namely, we aim to study the asymptotic behavior of the conditional Rényi entropy H 1+s (A n | f (A n ), E n |P n AE ) and its Gallager counterpart
. A preliminary study has been conducted in [67] .
2) Another set of related problems involve the analyses of the asymptotic behavior of H 1+s ( f (A n )|E n |P n AE ) and H ↑ 1+s ( f (A n )|E n |P n AE ). These represent the uncertainties of an eavesdropper with regard to the message index f (A n ) ∈ M. The eavesdropper, however, is equipped with correlated observations E n . We anticipate that some of the techniques developed in the current paper may be useful to perform various calculations.
3) We focused primarily on analyzing C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s for s ∈ [−1, 1]. It may be of interest to study the various asymptotic behaviors of C 1+s and C ↑ 1+s for general s ∈ R since for example, H min = lim s→∞ H 1+s and H min [6] - [9] is a fundamental quantity in cryptography and information-theoretic security as mentioned in Section I-A. Indeed, e −H min ( A|E|P AE ) is the best (highest) probability of successfully guessing A given E. As remarked after Theorems 1 and 3, we already have the converse parts for all s ≥ 0 for the results in (47), (48) , (68) and (69). They follow immediately from various information processing inequalities. It would be ideal, though challenging, to complete the story. 4) Lastly, we aim to apply the results and techniques derived herein to information-theoretic security problems such as the wiretap channel [12] and secret key agreement [20] as was done by various researchers in [18] , [19] , [21] , and [22] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
A. Proof of (102)
Proof: The derivation here is similar to that in [18] and [23] for universal 2 hash functions. Throughout, for any function f : A → M, we let
Now, for any a, due to the -almost universal 2 property of f X , we have (295) is inspired by the work of Hayashi [18] who derived a similar result but for Shannon-type quantities instead of Rényi-type quantities as we do here.
By (34), we have
Uniting (295) and (296) proves (102) as desired.
B. Proof of (103)
Proof: Along exactly the same lines, we also have in (36) , we obtain (103).
C. Proof of (104)
Proof: For any a, we have
First we observe that when P A|E (a|e) ≤ c M , we have
Now we have 
where in (311) we used the convexity of x → x −s where s ∈ [0, 1] and x ≥ 0 and in (312), we used (308), Thus, we obtain (104).
D. Proof of (105)
Proof: Using (308) and the convexity of a → a 
Using (296), we obtain (106). (341)
APPENDIX C PROOF
We obtain (107) as desired.
B. Proof of (108)
Proof: Using (309), we have 
B. Proof of (110)
We first state a useful and easy lemma: Lemma 7: Let x, y ≥ 0 and t ≥ 1. Then we have (x + y) t ≤ 2 t −1 (x t + y t ).
(362) Proof: It is clear that a → a t is convex for a ≥ 0. Thus, where in the last step, we applied Lemma 7 with t = 1 1−s ≥ 1 to the term in parentheses in (366). Thus we obtain (110).
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The inequalities in Lemma 5 can be shown by the information processing inequality for Rényi divergence in (11) . 
